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The proper role of tax policy in open economies has been and continues 
to be an area of considerable interest to economists.’ Boadway, Maital, 
and Prachowny  (1973) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974) consider op- 
timal tax policy in an open economy in the Ramsey sense of maximizing 
welfare subject to a revenue constraint. The principle result emerging 
from these two papers is that revenue considerations do not justify the 
introduction of  tariffs and other barriers to international trade-the 
only sound  welfare theoretic case for enacting trade barriers  is the 
optimum tariff argument. Along similar lines, Razin and Svensson (1983a) 
study the optimal response of tax rates and budget deficits to permanent 
and temporary productivity shocks. They show that, starting from a 
stationary state, both permanent and temporary drops in productivity 
call for permanent increases in tax rates while only temporary declines 
in productivity call for any change in the government’s budget (it should 
go into deficit when productivity is unusually low). Kimbrough (1986a) 
extends Razin and Svensson’s setup and examines the optimal response 
of tax rates, government spending, and budget deficits to inflows of 
foreign aid to the public and private sectors. He shows that tax rates 
should be permanently  reduced and government spending on public 
goods permanently  increased in response to an inflow of foreign aid 
accruing to the public sector, while just the reverse is optimal when 
the increment in foreign aid accrues to the private sector. Persson and 
Svensson (1986) consider how the public debt can be restructured over 
time  so  that the optimal tax  policy  will  be  time consistent, paying 
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particular attention to the differences in the required restructuring of 
the debt for large and small economies. 
Another major strand of the literature on the role of tax policy in 
open economies, in addition to studies based on the Ramsey tax prob- 
lem and its open economy implications, has dealt with the optimum 
use of tax policy to mitigate distortions and achieve noneconomic ob- 
jectives (see, for example, Johnson 1965 and Bhagwati 1968). The lit- 
erature on the  optimum  structure of  taxation for the  attainment  of 
noneconomic  objectives has  concentrated exclusively  on  microeco- 
nomic goals such as achieving a target level of output in the import- 
competing  sector, a target level of  imports, or a minimum level of 
employment in a given industry. However, many important policy ques- 
tions  concern the appropriate use of  tax  policy for macroeconomic 
objectives. For instance, one of the oldest and most pervasive argu- 
ments put forth in favor of tariffs, quotas, capital controls, and other 
barriers to international flows of goods and capital is that such policies 
are useful devices for improving a nation’s trade balance and correcting 
balance  of  payments difficulties. Indeed,  such  sentiments were  the 
cornerstone of the policy prescriptions of the mercantilists which Adam 
Smith attacked in  The  Wealth of  Nations. More recently, large and 
rising U.S. trade deficits, about 3.4%  of GNP in 1984 and up from 1.4% 
in 1982, have led Congress to consider enacting a 20% across-the-baard 
tariff. Work by Mussa (1974, 1976) and Razin and Svensson (1983b) 
sheds considerable light on the likely impact of these and other policies. 
Mussa demonstrates that levying a tariff will only temporarily improve 
the balance of payments; the most reliable way to permanently improve 
the balance of payments is to reduce the rate of domestic credit cre- 
ation. Razin and Svensson show that while temporary tariffs improve 
the current account by making current goods relatively more expensive 
in terms of future goods, the current account effects of permanent tariffs 
are ambiguous. 
Given that the impact of tariffs and other taxes on the balance of 
payments and the trade balance are by now fairly well understood, it 
seems appropriate to study the optimal structure of taxation for achiev- 
ing various balance of payments objectives. The purpose of this paper 
is to examine, from the perspective of the literature on noneconomic 
objectives, the optimal tax policies for achieving various balance of 
payments related objectives. The aim is to provide a general welfare 
theoretic framework for studying optimal policies concerning balance 
of  payments and other international finance related objectives. The 
basic framework of analysis is the traditional two-sector model of in- 
ternational trade theory and public finance modified to include both 
monetary considerations and intertemporal decision making. To  this 
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is extended to a two-good, production economy setup.* This frame- 
work is used to consider four balance of payments-related objectives. 
First,  the optimal tax  policy for attaining a trade balance target is 
examined. Second, the closely related issue of a target level for do- 
mestic wealth is discussed. Optimal taxation for achieving a target level 
of international reserve holdings by some prespecified date is the third 
issue to be  studied. Finally, the optimal tax policy for a balance of 
payments target is outlined. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 9.1 describes the economy. 
In section 9.2 the representative agent's optimization problem is dis- 
cussed, and in section 9.3 the economy's general equilibrium is out- 
lined. Sections 9.4-9.7 examine the optimal tax structure for attaining 
a trade balance target, a wealth target, a target level of  international 
reserves, and a balance of  payments target. Concluding remarks are 
presented in section 9.8. 
9.1  Description of the Economy 
Consider a small open economy that produces and consumes two 
traded goods. The economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived repre- 
sentative agent whose goal is to maximize his lifetime utility, U,  which 
is given by 
u = 2 pf-'U(X',Z'), 
f= I  (1) 
where 0 < p I  1 is the agent's subjective discount factor and X' and 
Z'  are his consumption of  the two goods in  period t. The pattern of 
international trade may vary over time; in  some periods good Z may 
be imported and in others it may be exported, and similarly for good 
X.  Production in  each sector is subject to constant returns to scale, 
and it is assumed that the factors of  production, labor and physical 
capital, are in fixed supply. In each period r the representative agent 
has two  sources of  income. First, the agent produces and sells his 
output of  the two goods, Xi and Z:, at the producer's  relative price 
pi. In terms of  good X  this provides the agent with income of  X; + 
p!zv.  Producer prices may  differ from consumer prices, p', and the 
world terms of  trade, p*', due to the presence of  taxes and subsidies 
on production, consumption, and international trade. In addition to his 
income from goods production, the agent also receives transfer pay- 
ments from the government that have a value of  in terms of good X. 
Domestic residents can also transact in domestic and world  bond 
markets, although transactions in the world market may be subject to 
taxes, subsidies, or capital controls. In period r the representative agent 
can buy or sell real bonds denominated in terms of  good X.  On  the 312  Kent P.  Kimbrough 
world  market one of these bonds yields  1  + r*'  units of good X  in 
period t  +  1, where  Y*'  is the world real interest rate. However, the 
return to domestic agents in  period t  +  1  is  1  + r'  which may differ 
from the world return due to the previously mentioned distortions. 
The monetary mechanism of exchange dictates that agents must use 
domestic currency to buy domestically  produced goods and foreign 
currency to buy foreign produced  Agents satisfy their demand 
for goods by purchasing them first from domestic suppliers and then 
from foreign suppliers. Therefore, if good X  is exported in period t and 
the agent purchases Xr  units of the good he will use his current holdings 
of  domestic money, My,  to buy them. Likewise, if good Z is imported 
in period t,  his purchases of imports 2'  -  Z;, will be financed out of 
his holdings of foreign money, M'. 
The sequencing of transactions in the economy is the same as that 
adopted by Helpman (1981) in his comparison of exchange-rate regimes 
and by Greenwood and Kimbrough (1987) in their investigation of for- 
eign exchange controls.  For purposes of outlining the sequencing of 
transactions a sketch of  one period of the representative agent's  life 
will now be given. Throughout this sketch it is assumed for illustrative 
purposes that good X  is exported and good 2 is imported in period t. 
The agent enters period t with a certain amount of  the two currencies 
left over from period t -  1. At the beginning of the period he receives 
domestic currency from his sales of goods in the previous period. That 
is, at the start of  period  t  the agent receives Pr-I(X;-I  + p;-,'Z$-l), 
where PI-  is the domestic currency price of good X  in period t - 1. 
At the same time the agent also receives his transfer payments from 
the government which have a nominal value of P'T'. 
Next, the agent enters the bond and foreign exchange markets. He 
receives income from the bonds he purchased last period of  P(1 + 
r'- I)br  -I  units of  domestic currency and buys new bonds worth P'b'. 
Having completed his bond market transactions the agent enters the 
foreign exchange market and allocates his cash holdings between do- 
mestic and foreign money in the amounts M'  and M'.  A unit of foreign 
currency exchanges for e'  units of domestic money, where the exchange 
rate, e', may either be market determined or pegged by the domestic 
government. 
During the last part of period r the agent uses the cash he has acquired 
to buy goods. He then enters period t  +  1 with M'  - Pr(Xr  + p'Z;) 
units of domestic currency and M" - P*'p'(Zr -  Z;.)  units of foreign 
currency, where P''  is the foreign currency price of good X.  Arbitrage 
in the world market for good X  guarantees that P'  = e'P'', t = 1,2 . . . . 
However, because of  taxes and subsidies on domestic consumption 
and production, there are wedges between the exchange rate adjusted 
foreign nominal price of good Z and the domestic nominal prices facing 
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9.2  The Agent's Optimization Problem 
The representative agent makes consumption, production, and asset 
choices so as to maximize his lifetime utility  as given by  (1).  This 
maximization is subject to the budget constraints facing the agent, the 
cash-in-advance constraints implied by the monetary mechanism  of 
exchange, and the production technology and factor supplies with which 
the agent is  endowed.  Given  the  setup of  the problem  the agent's 
production decisions will be made so as to maximize the present value 
of his output. Assuming that domestic markets are perfectly compet- 
itive, the solution to this problem yields output supply functions with 
the standard properties: 
(2)  x;  = xf(p:),  2: = Z;(p;),  t  = 1,2, . . . , 
(-1  (+) 
where the signs under the arguments of the supply functions show the 
signs of the partial derivatives of the supply functions. Since the supply 
functions in (2) maximize the value of output, X;  + pf Z;, the envelope 
theorem implies that 
(3) 
- ax:/ap: 
az;/ap:  = pf,  t  = 1,2. . . . 
Given his production choices as characterized by (2) and (3), the 
agent chooses X',  Z', mr = M'IP', m''  = MVP", and bf  for t = 1,2, . . . 
to maximize (1) subject to the following constraints for t  = 1,2, . . . 
(the convention here is that all period  zero variables are identically 
zero)  : 
(4) 
pt-  1 
P' 
m'  + m*'  + bf = -  [X;-l(p:-l)  + pf-IZf-I(pi-1)] + 7' 
pr- 1 
-  {mf-l  -  w[X'-  I  + p'- 'Zi-  '(pi-  I)]  P'  + (1 + rr-I)br-l + 
p*r-  1 
-  (1 -  w) [X:-l(pf-I)  + p'-'Z'-']}  + -{m*'-l 
-  "p'-"~'-l  -  2'-I (pi-l)] -  (1 -  w)  [Xf-l -  x;-yp;-1)]}, 
(5)  w[Xf + pr2f(p:)l + (1 -  w) [X:(pf)  + ~'2'1  5  m', 
(6)  wp"2'  - 2'  .dp;)I + (1 -  w)  [X' -  xf(P:)l  5  m*', 
where w is an indicator variable that equals one when good Z is im- 
ported and zero when good 2 is exported. (To keep the notation simple 
the possibility that both goods might be imported or exported in the 
same period  has been ignored.)  Equation (4)  is the agent's  period  t 
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budget constraint while equations (5) and (6) are the cash-in-advance 
constraints confronting the agent in period t. 
In the current framework, money is required for transactions pur- 
poses but agents choose whether or not to hold money as a store of 
value on the basis of wealth maximizing considerations. As discussed 
by Helpman (1981) and Greenwood and Kimbrough (1987), so long as 
domestic and foreign inflation rates, P' =  (P'+'  -  P')/Pf  and IT*'  = (P+  I 
-  P*')/P*f,  exceed the rates dictated by the optimum quantity of money 
rule, -  rf/(  1 + rt) and -  r*'/(  1 + r*'), bonds will dominate money as a 
store of  value and the cash-in-advance constraints, (5) and (6),  will 
hold  as equalities.  These conditions,  which imply positive nominal 
interest rates, are assumed to hold in the remainder of the analysis. 
Treating (5) and (6) as equalities and using them in (4),  it is straight- 
forward to show that maximization of (1) subject to the resulting con- 




where d'  = IIg/  (1 + rJ]-',  d1  = 1, and Uj = U,(Xf,Zf)  is the period t 
marginal utility of goodj, j = X,Z.  Within-period consumption choices 
are made so as to equate the marginal rate of substitution between the 
two goods to the consumer's  relative price, p'. The intertemporal al- 
location of consumption is such that the marginal rate of substitution 
between goods in period  1 and period t is equal to the domestic real 
discount factor, d'. 
ugu5 = p',  t  = 1,2, . . . , 
t = 1,2, . . . ,  pf-'U5/Uk  = d', 
9.3  General Equilibrium 
In addition to the representative agent whose consumption, produc- 
tion, and asset plans have  just been described, the economy has another 
actor: the government. Like the representative agent the government 
must  satisfy a budget constraint. For  the discussion of  optimal  tax 
policy that follows it is useful to artificially divide the government into 
two branches.  One branch of the government is the fiscal authority. 
They finance real transfer payments of 7'  - p' from the net revenues 
collected from the taxes and subsidies they levy on production, con- 
sumption, international trade, and international borrowing and lending. 
The fiscal authority's  budget constraint, which is not written out for- 
mally since the distorting taxes to be levied are yet to be determined, 
states that the present value of their transfer payments, ~d'(7'  -k'), 
must equal the present value of the net revenues earned on the dis- 
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The other branch of government, the central bank, controls the money 
stock or pegs the exchange rate through the use of transfer payments, 
p', and its holdings of interest-bearing international reserves, bk.4 The 
central bank's budget constraint for t  = 1,2, . . . is 
rn; -  rn;-q1  + +')  = p' + bk  -  (1  + r*'-l)bk-1, 
which states that the excess of the central bank's transfers and reserve 
acquisitions, bk -  bk-  over its interest earnings on its previous reserve 
holdings, r*f-lbk-l,  must be financed by money creation, rnf - 
(1  + 7cr-l),  where rn:  is the real money supply in period t. When the 
central bank is pegging the exchange rate rigidly or with preannounced 
adjustments, it is useful to rewrite their budget constraint as 
(9)  bk  = (1 + r.'-')bk-'  + [mi -  rn;-q1  + 7Ft-1)  -  p'], 
t=  1,2 .... 
Equation (9) emphasizes that the dynamic behavior of the central bank's 
international reserve holdings depends on the accumulation of interest 
on past reserve holdings and flows of reserves through the balance of 
payments. The balance of payments is the flow demand for real bal- 
ances, m: - rn;-l/(l  + T'-~),  less the flow supply of real  balances 
provided  by  the central bank via its domestic credit operations, p'. 
(Recall that the money stock is demand determined when the central 
bank pegs the exchange rate.) 
Equilibrium in the domestic money market requires that the demand 
for money  equal  the supply in  each period.  As noted  earlier,  with 
domestic and foreign inflation rates exceeding the rates dictated by the 
optimum quantity of money rule, the cash-in-advance constraints will 
hold with equality. From (5) it follows that, in real terms, the demand 
for domestic money by domestic residents is w[X'  + p'Z;(p;)] + (1 - 
o)[X:(pi)  + pfZfl.  If foreign residents are solving a similar optimization 
problem, then their demand for domestic money reflects their demand 
for imports of domestic goods. Since the goods market must clear in 
each period,  it follows that, in equilibrium, the foreign demand for 
domestic money equals w[X:(p:) - X'I  +  (1 - w)p'[Z; (pi) - Z'I. 
Therefore, the demand for domestic money in period t is simply the 
value of domestic output at consumer prices, and the money market 
equilibrium condition can be written as 
(10) 
Letting rn:  = M;/efYf,  where M: is the nominal money stock, it can 
be seen that under floating rates the money market equilibrium con- 
dition determines the equilibrium exchange rate while under a pegged- 
rate system it determines the equilibrium nominal money stock. From 
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(9) and (10) it follows that for a given exchange rate  policy, {ef = 
I?}:=~,  and nominal transfer policy, {F  = PrP*p!};"=,,  the time path of 
the  central  bank's  international reserves  reflects  movements  in  the 
balance of payments as determined by the intertemporal behavior of 
the demand for money. 
In addition to the previously discussed budget constraints and market 
clearing conditions, international trade must balance intertemporally. 
For the distortion-free case, this can be demonstrated by multiplying 
the sequence of budget constraints in  (4) by the discount factor dr = 
d" = IIjz/  (1 + r*']-l and summing the resulting expressions. The fact 
that the cash-in-advance constraints hold with equality can then be 
used to eliminate the money terms from the resulting equation. Finally, 
the transfer payment terms can be eliminated by discounting and sum- 
ming the central bank's budget constraint as given by (9), using (10) in 
the resulting expression, and noting that in the absence of  distorting 
taxes T'  = IJ.'. This yields the desired intertemporal trade balance con- 
dition (p: = p*' when there are no distortions) 
(1 1) 
A similar proof, but one involving the fiscal authority's  budget con- 
straint, shows that  (1 1) must also hold in  the presence of distorting 
taxes and subsidies. 
m  m 
2 sqxt + p*'Z') = c &"X:(p:)  + p*rz:(p:.)l. 
r=  I  r=l 
9.4  Trade Balance Target 
Trade balance deficits are commonly viewed with alarm by policy- 
makers and they are not long tolerated before action is taken to elim- 
inate them.  One possible explanation for such concerns may be the 
observed correlation between declines in income and a worsening trade 
balance that arises as a result of the consumption-smoothing behavior 
of consumers in response to temporary changes in income. Despite the 
fact that the resulting correlation between income and the trade balance 
reflects the optimal response of consumers to exogenous fluctuations 
in income, if policymakers mistakenly believe causation to be running 
from the trade balance to income they may perceive there to be some 
scope for activist policy to improve matters. Although it is apparent 
that for a distortion-free small open economy the imposition of trade 
balance targets by the government can only reduce welfare, it is im- 
portant from an economic standpoint to consider the welfare maxi- 
mizing structure of taxes and subsidies for attaining trade balance tar- 
gets when the government deems them to be desirable. 317  Optimal Tax Policy for Balance of Payments Objectives 
Formally, suppose that the government imposes a sequence of trade 
balance targets, &,  for periods t  = 1, . . .  ,k. These constraints require 
that 
(12)  X:(pi) -  X'  + p*'[Zi(p:) - Zf]  2  &',  t  =  1, . . . ,  k . 
The optimal policy maximizes the representative agent's lifetime utility 
as given by (1)  subject to the economy's lifetime budget constraint (1 1) 
and the sequence of trade balance targets given by (12). Technically, 
the planning problem confronting the government is to choose {Xj}:=  I, 
{Zt}:=  and @:}:=  I  to maximize 
k 
r=1  + C ewj{x:(p:) - xi  + p*j[z;(p:)  - zj] -  ibj}, 
where A is the marginal utility of wealth and Ord*' is the marginal welfare 
loss associated with tightening the period-t trade balance constraint. It 
should be noted here that the government can manipulate domestic 
residents' consumption profiles by setting consumption taxes and taxes 
on international borrowing appropriately. 
In addition to the constraints the first-order conditions that emerge 
from the government's optimization problem given by (13) are5 
(14a)  Uh/Uk = p*',  t  = 1,2,.  . . , 
t=  1,2, ..., 
t=  1, ...,  k, 
1  + (Wh) 
(14c)  p'-'U&/Uk  = 1 
t=k+  1, ..., 
1 
6*'  ' [  1 + (eI/A)]' 
where 8'  is the world real discount factor for period t. 
The first-order conditions (14a) and (14b), in conjunction with the 
representative agent's first-order conditions (3) and (7), show that the 
optimal policy calls for setting within-period relative prices confronting 
consumers and producers equal to world relative prices (i.e., p'  = pi 
= p*t). From (8) and (14c) it is also clear that the optimal policy for 
attaining a series of trade balance targets entails distorting intertem- 
poral choices.  Specifically, in order to induce domestic residents to 
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are lifted for consumption in those periods when they are in effect, 
international borrowing should be taxed (or equivalent policies intro- 
duced) in periods t  = 1, . . . ,  k. Furthermore, taxes on international 
borrowing should be highest in those periods where the trade balance 
constraint is most severe (and hence Or is greatest). This structure of 
taxes serves to generate the appropriate intertemporal pattern of sub- 
stitution by domestic residents.6 It should be noted here that systems 
of  capital controls and dual exchange rates can replicate the optimal 
tax structure described by (14). (See Adams and Greenwood [1985] on 
the equivalence of capital controls and dual exchange rates and Green- 
wood and Kimbrough [I9851 for a look at capital controls and fiscal 
policy.) 
The intuition  behind  these results is straightforward. The goal of 
achieving a prespecified sequence of trade balances is essentially aimed 
at attaining a given intertemporal pattern  of consumption (and pro- 
duction in  a framework that allows for intertemporal production de- 
cisions such as investment in physical capital). It is therefore optimal 
to enact a tax program that strikes directly at intertemporal relative 
prices while leaving within-period relative prices undistorted. This rules 
out tariffs,  export  subsidies, and  other trade policies that  strike at 
within-period relative  prices  as part of the optimal tax package for 
achieving trade balance targets. 
Earlier it was argued  that governments may institute policies de- 
signed to achieve a target trade balance because consumption smooth- 
ing by consumers results in temporary drops in income worsening the 
trade balance, and policymakers may view causation as running from 
the trade balance to income rather than the other way around as is 
actually the case. In fact, if governments institute trade balance targets 
when income is temporarily low, the burden of adjusting consumption 
spending will be concentrated in those periods when income shocks 
occur rather than being spread over consumers’ lifetimes.  Enacting 
trade balance targets in response to temporary income fluctuations thus 
reduces welfare,  relative  to the no-intervention benchmark,  by pre- 
venting consumers from engaging in desirable consumption-smoothing 
behavior. In fact, enacting such targets can result in an intertemporal 
consumption pattern that, from the perspective of the permanent-income 
hypothesis, appears to exhibit excess sensitivity to current income. 
9.5  Wealth Target 
Another reason countries may undertake policies designed to ma- 
nipulate the trade balance or current account is a preoccupation with 
their wealth or net foreign asset position.  Such concerns may arise 
because,  as in the case of the mercantilists, changes in  a country’s 319  Optimal Tax  Policy for Balance of Payments Objectives 
wealth are erroneously taken to be indicators of changes in welfare or 
because policymakers desire to shift the intertemporal pattern of utility, 
In order to study the optimal tax policy for achieving a target level 
of wealth, and to examine its connection with trade balance targets, 
note that by period k, the country's net foreign asset position will be 
given by 
{U(X',Z')};=  I. 
k 
r= I 
bk =  * 2  d"{Xi(p:) -  X'  + p*'[Z;(p:) -  ZJ}. 
That is, the country's external wealth by period k is simply the sum 
of principle and interest earned on its past trade balances. If the gov- 
ernment adopts a wealth target of 6  for period k, the problem they face 
is to maximize 
c. p'-IU(X',Z') + h . c, d*'{X:(p:) -  X'  + p*"z:(p:) -  2'1) 
t=  I  I= 1 
k  + 9 - (C  s'{x;(  pi) -  X'  + p*'[z:(  pi) -  Z'I} -  d'kb) 
f=l 
by choosing the time profiles {Xf}:=  I,  {Zr};=,  ,  and {pi};=,  where 8flk  is 
the marginal welfare cost of raising the period-k wealth target. It is 
important to note that when policy is directed toward increasing wealth 
at world prices, as in the problem being studied here, no attention is 
given to the distribution of foreign asset holdings between private agents, 
the fiscal authorities, and the central bank but only to the overall level 
of wealth, bk.  More will be said about this issue in the following section. 
It is easily verified that, in addition to the constraints, the first-order 
conditions for the government's  problem are 
(15a)  UilUi = p*' ,  t  = 1,2,. . . , 
= p"  ,  -  axyap: 
(15b)  az:/ap; 
t = 1,2,. . . , 
Id'',  t=  1, ...,  k, 
From (15a) and (15b) it follows immediately  that, as was the case 
with a trade balance target, the optimal attainment of a wealth target 
does not call for introducing any within-period distortions; the marginal 
rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation  between 
goods at a point in  time should both be set equal to world  relative 
prices (i.e., p'  = p: = p*'). However, from (15c) it can be seen that, 320  Kent P.  Kimbrough 
again as was the case with a trade balance target, a wealth target is 
best attained by taxing international borrowing in periods t  =  I, . . . 
,k. The intuition again is the same: taxing international borrowing in 
the periods prior to the date when the wealth target is to be met dis- 
courages consumption and encourages saving and wealth accumulation. 
Although the overall character of the optimal tax policies for attaining 
balance of trade and wealth targets are very similar, there is one key 
difference: When the government imposes a wealth target, tax rates 
on  international  borrowing  should  be  equated  in  all  periods 
t =  1, . . . ,k. This reflects the optimality, from a welfare standpoint, 
of spreading the burden of attaining the wealth target  evenly across 
periods t = 1, . . .  ,k. However, with balance of trade targets applying 
to periods t = 1, . . . ,k, taxes on international borrowing will generally 
differ across periods in a rather complicated way. This means that if 
policymakers are concerned with increasing wealth, it is inefficient to 
attempt to do so by imposing a sequence of trade balance targets on 
the economy. The reason is that by instituting a system of trade balance 
targets that will produce the target wealth level, the government, gen- 
erally speaking, imposes an unnecessary constraint on the intertem- 
poral  pattern  of  wealth accumulation that can  only reduce  welfare. 
Finally, note that the example of policies aimed at attaining a target 
wealth level highlights the distinction between wealth and welfare. It 
is straightforward to show that with a target wealth level of 6 applying 
to period k, welfare evaluated from period k  +  1 on is higher than it 
would have been in the absence of a wealth target. This follows from 
the fact that the consumer’s indirect utility function from period k  + 
1 on is an increasing, concave function in period-k wealth. However, 
from the perspective of  period one, when the wealth target  is intro- 
duced, agents’ lifetime welfare is clearly reduced. That is, the govern- 
ment’s policy of enacting taxes to increase wealth, even when optimally 
carried out, actually reduces welfare. (A related point has been made 
by Murphy [1985] regarding the impact of tariffs on the time profile of 
agents’ utilities.) 
9.6  International Reserve Target 
Oftentimes countries that have adopted a fixed exchange rate or a 
crawling peg find confidence in  the exchange rate being undermined 
by an impending balance of payments crisis. Such crises typically in- 
volve a situation in which the central bank’s holdings of international 
reserves  have dwindled  to  so low a level  that  a  speculative attack 
threatens to deplete the remaining stock. One way to forestall such an 
attack is to implement a comprehensive package of monetary and fiscal 
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through a sustained period of balance of payments surpluses. A key 
ingredient of such policy reforms is to reduce domestic credit creation, 
P,  or to devalue the domestic currency. In the context of the model 
being used here, these policies would be reflected by a drop in pr  which 
would  trigger  an  improvement  in  the  balance  of  payments, 
m: -  m:-l/(l  + nr-') - p', and a buildup of international reserves, 
bk, by the central bank. 
In models similar to the one being used here it has been shown (e.g., 
Helpman  [1981], Lucas [1982], and Stockman  [1983]) that exchange 
rate management policies have no real effects. This result is an open 
economy implication of Ricardian equivalence. Therefore, under debt 
neutrality, when policymakers  wish  to defend  the exchange rate by 
building up the central bank's  stock of international reserves to some 
target level, the first-best policy always involves adjusting the time- 
path of domestic credit.'  However, for whatever reasons, countries do 
not always adjust their domestic credit policies sufficiently, and some 
of the burden of adjusting the economy to the exchange rate ultimately 
falls on fiscal policy. This section of  the paper examines the optimal 
tax policy, in the fiscal sense, for achieving a target level of international 
reserves. The following section takes up the closely related issue of 
the optimal tax policy for achieving a balance of  payments target. It 
should be borne in mind that in both cases the tax policies being dis- 
cussed are second-best for the noneconomic objective under consid- 
eration; the first-best policy in both instances would be to alter the 
central bank's  real transfer sequence, {pf};"= by changing the time- 
path of domestic credit. This would directly affect the balance of pay- 
ments and the central bank's  international reserve holdings without 
creating welfare reducing distortions. 
9.6.1  The Government's Optimization Problem 
Suppose that the government desires to build the central bank's stock 
of international reserves up to the target level bR by the end of period 
k. By repeated substitution using the central bank's budget constraint, 
(9),  it can be shown that period-k reserve holdings will be 
k 
bk  = (l/~)  . Cd*r[m: -  m;-I/(I + +I)  - p'1 
where  (1  +  ir) = (1  +  +)(l  +  r*') implicitly defines the domestic 
nominal interest rate, if.  Recall that arbitrage in the market for good 
X  implies that  1  +  IT^  = (1 + E')(  +  TI'),  where E'  = (e'+' -  er)ler  is 
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Therefore, it follows that the interest  parity  condition  1  +  if = (1 
+ gr)(l + i*')  holds, where i*'  =  r*' + r*'  + r*'r*' is the foreign nominal 
interest  rate.  It  should be  noted  here that  if,  which is exogenously 
determined by world market conditions and domestic policy, is actually 
the domestic nominal interest rate prior to accounting for any wedge 
driven between domestic and foreign real interest rates by  domestic 
tax policy. However, this is the nominal interest rate that is relevant 
for calculating the inflation tax revenues earned by the central bank 
through the accumulation of interest-bearing international reserves. 
Since the international reserve target requires that the central bank's 
period-k reserves, as given above, meet or exceed bR, and since the 
money supply is demand determined under pegged rates according to 
(lo), the planning problem confronting the government is to choose 
time profiles for X', Z', and pf that maximize* 
m  2c 
(16)  C p'-'U(X',Zf) + A.  d*'{Xf(p:) -  X'  + p*'[Zi(p:) -  Z']} 
r=  I  r=1 
where use has been made of the fact that optimization on the part of 
private agent's imposes (7) as an incentive compatibility condition. (It 
can be seen immediately from [  161 that by adjusting {p'}f=  I  the target 
can be hit at no cost.) 
With some manipulation it can be shown that the first-order condi- 
tions for the government's problem yield the following tangency con- 
ditions (if  has been taken to be constant to simplify the notation): 
p''  + W(i/l  + i)sfu 
t=  1, ...,  k-  1, 
1 -  e'(i/l + i)st ' 
t=k, 
L  P*',  t=k+  1, ..., 
Ape' + a(i/l + i)p' 
A + a(i/l + i) 
t=  1, ...,  k- 1,  ' 
t=k, 
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t=k+  I, ..., 
1 
1 -  W(i/l + i)s; ' 
d"'. 
where 
el  = ~;HYXU~,  H'  = 2p1uiZ - uhz - byuf~~  > o , 
s~U = @'Ukz - U&)/H'  > 0 , 
and 
The term sj, j = X,Z ,  is the marginal change in an agent's  purchases 
of goodj  when the expenditure allocated to period t changes. It follows 
from the within-period budget constraint that sk  +p's$  = 1 . 
9.6.2  Interpretation 
To begin with, note from the agent's first-order condition (7) and the 
first-order condition  (17a) that given the international reserve target 
the optimum tax on consumption of good Z can be calculated as 
S$ = (U$X -  p'U$x)/H' > 0 . 
t=  1,. . . ,k - 1, 
(Ot/p*t)(i/l  + i) 
1 - eq/i + i)sh ' 
t=k, 
t=k+ 1, ..., 
where q' satisfies Uh/Uk = pt = (1 + qr)p*' . The first thing to notice 
is that the optimal policy calls for no within-period taxes on consump- 
tion after the "deadline"  period, period k. In interpreting the tax rates 
for periods r  = 1, . . . ,  k it is useful to consider as a benchmark the 
case where the initial distortion-free equilibrium is a steady-state so 
that p*f,  Or,  sfu,  and sk  are constant across periods. In this case it is 
readily  seen that  the optimal  tax  structure involves levying a con- 
sumption tax on good 2 that is constant up until the deadline period 
and then raising the consumption tax to a higher level in period k when 
the reserve target must be fulfilled. In fact, the period-k consumption 
tax rate is somewhat greater than (1  +  i)/i  times that in the earlier 
periods. For typical values of the nominal interest rate it follows that 
the optimal consumption tax in period k may be several times that for 
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The intuition behind these results is as follows: As can be seen from 
(lo), enacting a consumption tax raises the demand for money and, 
given the central bank's domestic credit policy p', improves the balance 
of payments and leads to an inflow of international reserves. During 
periods  1, . . . ,  k - 1 the central bank accumulates reserves from 
increments to money demand at a rate equal to the interest earned on 
its inflation tax revenues of  i/(l  +  i).  This follows from the fact that 
while a consumption  tax levied in period  t improves the balance  of 
payments in period t by p*'Z;dq', it raises agents' initial levels of real 
balance at the start of period t  +  1 and thus worsens the balance of 
payments in period t  +  1 by p*'Z;dq'/(l  + +).  Therefore, in period t 
present-value terms, a consumption tax levied then adds ip*'Z:dqf/(  1 
+ i) to the central bank's international reserves. Since the latter influ- 
ence is not explicitly accounted for during the deadline period, period 
k, consumption  taxes levied then contribute p*kZ$dqk toward the re- 
serve target.  It is thus  optimal to tax consumption most heavily in 
period k. Finally, it can be seen that, all else equal, consumption taxes 
should be relatively low in periods where world relative prices, p*', are 
relatively high. This pattern of taxation serves to smooth fluctuations 
in domestic relative prices facing consumers, p'  = (1  + q')p*'. 
Returning to the benchmark steady-state case, it can be seen from 
(17c) that the intertemporal taxes called for by the optimal plan serve 
to mitigate the welfare-reducing effects of the within-period consump- 
tion taxes that were just discussed. To  see this, note first that no in- 
tertemporal distortions are introduced between any two periods c and 
c  + j after the deadline period. However, the government's intertem- 
poral taxes act to subsidize international borrowing in periods  1,  . . . , 
k.9 This serves to reallocate consumption from the later periods, where 
consumers'  within-period marginal rates of  substitution equal world 
relative prices, to the earlier periods, where consumption taxes have 
raised consumers'  marginal rates of  substitution above world relative 
prices so that a welfare gain of ~~-'Ufir'p*~  attaches to increases in the 
consumption of good Z. Additionally, given the initial equilibrium was 
a steady state, it can be seen that agents' intertemporal choices between 
periods t = 1, . . . k - 1 are left undistorted and hence are all taxed 
relative to period k.  Since all periods  f  =  1, . . . ,  k are subsidized 
relative to the later periods, it follows that international borrowing is 
subsidized equally in periods prior to period k (in which consumption 
taxes are equal) and subsidized at a higher rate in period k (when the 
consumption tax is the highest). 
Equation (17b) characterizes  the optimum structure of production 
taxes. Recalling the competitive profit maximizing condition (3), and 
using the condition pr = (1 + q')~*~,  it can be demonstrated that the 325  Optimal Tax Policy for Balance of Payments Objectives 
optimal policy calls for the production of good Z to be subsidized at 
the rate 
a(i/l + i)q' 
A  + a(i/l + i) ' 
t=l,  ...,  k-  1, 
t=k, 
t=k+  1, ..., 
where pi  = (1  + q;)p*'. As was the case for consumption decisions, 
production decisions are left undistorted after period k. Production is 
subsidized from the current period through period k, with the subsidy 
remaining constant until period k when it is increased. The explanation 
for the intertemporal pattern of production subsidies is the same as 
that outlined earlier for the intertemporal pattern of consumption taxes. 
The optimal policy calls for subsidies to good 2 production because 
this raises the demand for money and augments the buildup of reserves. 
Both consumption taxes and production subsidies work in this direc- 
tion, and it is optimal to distort both  decisions until their marginal 
welfare costs are equal. However, it is readily apparent that this occurs 
when  production  subsidies  are lower  than  consumption taxes (i.e., 
when q;  5  qt).  The reason for this is that since agent's trading oppor- 
tunities are constrained by the intertemporal budget constraint (I l), it 
is optimal to minimize as much as possible the reduction in the value 
of domestic output at world prices that is generated by distorting pro- 
duction decisions. 
Finally, unlike  the  optimal  policy for a  trade balance target, the 
optimal policy for an international reserve target does, in essence, entail 
levying tariffs, export subsidies, or equivalent trade distortions that 
divert within-period domestic relative  prices from their world  level. 
This follows from the well-known result that imposing a consumption 
tax and a production subsidy on importables (exportables) at equal 
rates is equivalent to imposing a tariff (export subsidy) at that rate. 
Therefore, from the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the optimal 
policy for a reserve target can be structured to include tariffs at the 
rate q;.  plus additional consumption taxes on good Z at the rate (qt - 
q;)/(l  + q:)  during those periods when good Z is imported and export 
subsidies and consumption taxes on good 2 at the rates q;  and (q' - 
q;)/(l  + q;)  during those periods when good Z is exported. 
At this point it is worth reemphasizing that the first-best policy for 
building up international  reserves is to devalue or reduce the rate of 
growth of domestic credit. However, neither of these policies have real 
effects, and they  thus alter only the composition  of  the economy's 326  Kent P. Kimbrough 
wealth  between  private holdings of foreign assets and  central bank 
holdings of international reserves rather than the overall level of wealth. 
In contrast, the set of taxes outlined above does alter the economy's 
overall level of  wealth.  If  the policymaker's objective is to attain a 
target  wealth level, it is easy to see by  comparing  the  tax  policies 
implicit in (15) and (17) that international reserve targets are not the 
welfare maximizing policy.I0 Intuitively, the reason is that instituting 
international  reserve targets imposes a constraint on the distribution 
of wealth between  the private sector, the fiscal authorities,  and the 
central bank that is unnecessary when the goal is simply to accumulate 
wealth (devaluation or reductions of domestic credit growth  can be 
used to build up international reserves but not wealth). Alternatively, 
if  the distribution of wealth is itself the goal, devaluation or changes 
in domestic credit are the optimal policy since neither lowers welfare 
as do the tax policies described by (17). The upshot is that while pol- 
icymakers worldwide are constantly preoccupied with the level of their 
central bank's international reserves, tax policies designed with such 
targets in  mind will not generally be optimal from the perspective of 
wealth accumulation or distribution despite the fact that international 
reserves held  by  the central bank do constitute  part of  a country's 
wealth. 
9.7  Balance of  Payments Target 
The last section was concerned with a case where the government 
has a target level of international reserves for period k and allows the 
balance of payments to adjust optimally to attain this target. An alter- 
native, and generally inferior, policy for building up reserves to support 
the exchange rate is to impose a sequence of constraints on the balance 
of payments that assures reserve holdings will reach the target level at 
the appropriate time. Such balance of payments targets may be imposed 
either directly by the domestic government or by  the domestic gov- 
ernment at the behest of international creditors. 
9.7.1  The Government's Optimization Problem 
of balance of payments targets, (bkf}f=  I, requires that 
To find the optimal tax policy in this instance, note that the sequence 
m: -  rn-I/(l  + IT-') - pr 2 b)',  t  = 1, . . . ,  k  . 
The government's  problem  is  thus  to  choose {Xf}:=,,  {Zf}:=,  , and 
(p:}:=,  so as to maximize11 
(18)  9  pf-'U(Xf,Zf)  + A * 2 S'{X;(p:) - Xf 
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+ p'"Zi(P:)  -  ZtI) 
+ c  a'd"[Xi(P:) + (uwk)z;(P:) 
k 
I=  I 
x:-  '(pi-  1)  + (Uh-  'lug  1)z:-  I( pi-  1)  - 
1  + rr-I 
- p,'  - 6pq . 
In  addition to the constraints the first-order conditions for (18) are 
(again it is taken to be constant to simplify the notation) 
Ap*' + (at -  z.)pl 
A+  (at-%.)  ' 
Apt' + alpf 
X+a'  ' 
P"  9 
t=k, 
t=k+  1, ..., 
t=l,  ...,  k-  1, 
t=k, 
t=k+  I, ..., 
where 8'  = Z;Ht/AVk. 328  Kent P.  Kimbroueh 
q'  =  4 
9.7.2  Interpretation 
In conjunction with  (7) it can be seen from (19a) that the optimal 
structure of taxes and subsidies on the consumption of good Z satisfies 
t  = k, 
(0,  t=k+1, ... . 
Several features of the optimal policy are readily apparent. First, within- 
period consumption choices should be left undistorted in those periods 
with no balance of  payments objectives (t = k  +  1, . . .). Second, 
during those periods where the government has set balance of payments 
targets, consumption of good Z in period t should be taxed or subsidized 
as the shadow value of an exogenous increase in  period-t money de- 
mand, af - a*+'/(l  + i),  is positive or negative. Intuitively, when the 
shadow value of real balances is positive (negative) a tax (subsidy) on 
the consumption of  good Z  is called for to raise (lower) the demand 
for money. To  see that af - af+*/(l  +  i)  can be  interpreted as the 
shadow value of an exogenous increase in the demand for money, note 
that a one-unit exogenous increase in  period t money demand raises 
current  utility by afP,  since less reliance  on period t distortions is 
called for to meet the balance of payments target. However, this means 
greater distortions in period t  +  1  are called for to meet the balance 
of payments target then. These added distortions reduce current utility 
by af+ld*f+l/(l  + IT<).  Therefore, in terms of current utility the marginal 
benefit of an exogenous increase in the period-? demand for money is 
The term in brackets thus measures the shadow value, as of period t, 
of  exogenous increments to money demand. (Note that period k  is a 
special case of this argument where ak+l  = 0 .) 
The exact intertemporal pattern of consumption taxes, q',  will  de- 
pend on (i) the sequence of balance of payments targets, {6p*};=  I, and 
(ii) the time-path of nominal domestic credit and the exchange rate as 
reflected in the real transfer sequence, {F~}T=,  . For purposes of  illus- 
tration, suppose the economy is initially in a steady state with a constant 
real transfer sequence, p* = CI. V t ,  and a uniform balance of payments 
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the balance of payments constraint that the consumption tax on good 
2 must rise over time. That is, the optimal policy entails qk  > qk-1 
> . . . > q1  > 0 .  The reason for this is that as each successive balance 
of payments constraint is met, agents' beginning-of-period real balances 
get  higher and  higher. In order to generate  a constant excess flow 
demand for money, the demand for money must be pushed higher and 
higher via increases in consumption taxes. In general, when compared 
with this benchmark case, those periods with larger (smaller) real trans- 
fers and more (less) ambitious balance of payments objectives will have 
their consumption taxes raised (lowered). 
The optimal structure of production subsidies and taxes on good 2 
can be obtained from (19b). Recalling that p'  = (1  + qf)p*'  and using 
(3) it can be shown that 
I 
rl:  = 
As was the case 
a'q' 
A  + a" 
t  = k, 
0,  t=k+l,  ... . 
for consumption, production decisions should be left 
undistorted  in those periods where there is no balance of  payments 
target. In all periods where there is a balance of payments target, the 
production of good Z should be subsidized. The rationale behind this 
is that regardless of the shadow value of additional money demand, a' 
-  a'+  I/(  1 + i),  a production subsidy moves money demand, the value 
of  domestic output at consumer prices, in the appropriate direction. 
This is illustrated in figure 1 for the case a'  - a'+'/(l  + i) > 0 where 
period-t consumption is taxed because increases in money demand are 
desirable and in figure 2 for the case a'  - af+I/(1  + i)  < 0 where the 
opposite is true. In both cases the production equilibrium is at A before 
and at B after the production subsidy is implemented. As can be seen, 
in both instances the production subsidy moves the value of domestic 
output at consumer prices in the correct direction as shown by the shift 
of the p'  line as production shifts from A to B. Third, note that once 
again the optimal policy calls for production distortions, I$,  to be less 
in  absolute  terms  than  consumption distortions,  q'.  Finally,  in  the 
benchmark case discussed earlier the optimum production subsidy will 
rise over time (i.e., q$  > qt-l > . . . > qi > 0). 
Turning next to the optimal structure of  taxes and subsidies on in- 
ternational borrowing, consider equation (19c). Between periods with- 
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2' 
Fig. 9.1  a'  -  cr'+L/(l +i) > 0 
into agents' intertemporal consumption pattern.  For the periods with 
balance of payments targets, international borrowing should be sub- 
sidized or taxed as the shadow value of money demand, a'  - a'+ '/(  1 
+ i)  ,  is positive or negative.I3 The intertemporal substitution effects 
that this pattern of taxes and subsidies generates act to minimize the 
welfare cost of attaining the balance of payments objectives by shifting 
agents' consumption profiles towards those periods where consumption 
of good Z is taxed, and hence UklUl, >  p*', and away from those periods 
where consumption of good Z is subsidized, and hence UL/Ul, < p*'. 
In the benchmark case the optimal policy calls for a rising subsidy to 
international borrowing throughout the period of balance of payments 
targets. This reflects the need to mitigate the welfare costs imposed on 
the economy by the rising consumption tax levied on good Z. 
In comparing the case where the government imposes a balance of 
payments target  on the  economy for k  periods,  perhaps  with some 
ultimate reserve target in mind, with that where it has an international 
reserve target for period k but allows the intertemporal pattern of the 
balance of  payments to adjust optimally, it should be noted that the 
first-order conditions for the former problem are equivalent to those 
for the latter when a*,  the marginal cost of tightening the balance of 
payments constraint, is constant across periods (i.e., when a' = . . . 
= a").  Therefore, for a given  real  transfer sequence {qt}$=l,  if  the 
sequence of balance of payments targets, {bp'}$,  is properly chosen 
the strategy of imposing a sequence of balance of payments constraints 
can replicate the optimal policy for achieving a target reserve level, bR. 
However, if  the ultimate goal is to build the central bank's  stock of 
international reserves  up to some desired  level, then  attempting to 
accomplish this by instituting some arbitrary sequence of balance of 





Fig. 9.2  cd  - d-V(l+i) < 0 
of the balance of payments is an extra constraint on the economy and 
can only reduce welfare more than is necessary in order to attain the 
reserve target. 
9.8  Conclusion 
This paper has outlined an extended version of the traditional two- 
sector model of international trade and public finance that incorporates 
intertemporal consumption choices and monetary considerations. The 
resulting framework was used to examine the optimal tax policies as- 
sociated with various noneconomic objectives relating to the balance 
of payments accounts. First, the optimal policy for achieving a trade 
balance objective was considered. This policy was shown to involve 
levying taxes on international borrowing (or equivalent policies) so as 
to shift consumption away from those periods where an improved trade 
balance is deemed desirable. It was also shown that the optimal policy 
for reaching a trade balance target leaves intact the within-period ef- 
ficiency conditions  U$/Uk = p** = ( -  dX:/dp:)/(dZ:/dp:>. Therefore, 
trade balance goals do not call for instituting tariffs or export subsidies 
that drive a wedge between world and domestic relative prices. The 
optimal policy for a trade balance objective was then compared with 
the optimal policy for achieving a wealth target. It was demonstrated 
that the two policies differ, because  while a wealth  target  calls for 
enacting a time invariant tax rate on international borrowing, the op- 
timal attainment of a trade balance target generally speaking entails a 
time varying tax rate on international borrowing. 
An  international reserve target was the next policy for which the 
optimal structure of  taxation was derived. Starting from a distortion- 
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domestic credit and exchange rate policies, it was shown that the op- 
timal tax  structure entails consumption taxes, production subsidies, 
and subsidies to international  borrowing that are constant across pe- 
riods until the reserve target  is to be met, and then raised, perhaps 
substantially, when the day of reckoning arrives. After this period all 
distortions should be dismantled. It was also pointed out that the within- 
period distortions introduced by the optimal policy can be structured 
to include tariffs and export subsidies. 
The fourth, and final, objective for which the optimal tax policy was 
constructed was a sequence of balance of payments targets. Under the 
conditions outlined above, and assuming a constant balance of pay- 
ments objective, the optimal policy was demonstrated  to consist of 
rising consumption taxes and production subsidies as well as rising 
subsidies to international borrowing throughout the period of balance 
of payments goals. Again, it was also argued that all distortions should 
be immediately dismantled after this time. Although not pointed out in 
the text, it should be apparent that in this instance the optimal policy’s 
within-period distortions can again be replicated by a system of tariffs 
and export subsidies (accompanied with additional consumption taxes 
or subsidies as well). 
Some interesting results  emerge from comparing the optimal  tax 
structures for the four noneconomic objectives that were investigated 
here. First, while international reserve targets and balance of payments 
targets are obviously closely related, the optimum tax policies for the 
two goals differ significantly. This is because the latter policy is aimed 
at attaining a certain intertemporal behavior for the balance of pay- 
ments while from the perspective of the former policy such behavior 
is largely irrelevant. Second, although it is apparent from the balance 
of payments accounting identities that improving the trade balance is 
one way  to achieve an international reserve target or a balance of 
payments goal, it is clear that the optimal policies for these objectives 
differ dramatically. The goals of an improved balance of payments and 
a reserve target can both be optimally accomplished, given domestic 
credit and exchange rate policies,  via  a policy that includes tariffs, 
export subsidies, and other within-period distortions. However, such 
distortions and trade impediments are not part of the optimal tax mix 
for improving the trade balance. An improved trade balance calls for 
a system of taxes on international borrowing (or equivalent policies). 
This is in  stark contrast to the system of  subsidies to international 
borrowing required by a reserve target and, at least during some pe- 
riods, by  a balance of  payments target.14 Finally, it was argued that 
international reserve targets cannot be justified (i.e., are not first-best) 
if the policymaker’s goal is to attain a target level of wealth or a given 
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and the central bank. If the goal is a target wealth level, a constant tax 
rate  on international borrowing  should be  levied (until the deadline 
period) and no within-period distortions should be introduced, while 
if the objective is to alter the composition of net foreign asset holdings, 
shifts in the time profiles of domestic credit and the exchange rate are 
appropriate. 
A number of extensions and implications of the analysis of optimal 
policies undertaken here suggest themselves. To the extent that trade 
barriers are erected and torn down because of noneconomic objectives 
like the ones considered here, the public-finance-type approach that 
has  been  adopted  can be used  to study  the optimal  sequencing of 
economic liberalizations.  Capturing important aspects of  the liberali- 
zation process might entail extending the model to include sector-spe- 
cific capital or other features giving rise to dynamics on the production 
side of the economy, but the approach is, in principle, capable of dealing 
with these and other issues. 
Another possible extension concerns the use of the cash-in-advance 
constraint to model money. It might be useful to model money in a 
way that allows the velocity of money to vary with nominal interest 
rates.  This could be done by  using the transactions  technology  em- 
ployed by Adams and Greenwood (1985) or by adopting the variant of 
the cash-in-advance approach suggested by  Svensson (1985). Either 
extension would give money real effects, essentially through an infla- 
tion  tax  channel, thereby  potentially  allowing for a  more  elaborate 
interaction between monetary and fiscal policies. In the current frame- 
work the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies is limited to 
the  impact  of  domestic inflation on  the slopes of  the  tax  rate  time 
profiles. For example, with an international reserve target the slope of 
the consumption tax profile is adequately summarized by the ratio qk/ 
q',  t = 1, . . . ,  k - 1 ,  in the steady-state case. As can be seen from 
the results outlined  in  section 9.6, when the initial equilibrium is a 
steady state, qk/q*  is directly related to (1 + i)/i.  Therefore, the higher 
the domestic inflation rate, and hence the higher the domestic nominal 
interest rate, the flatter the time profile of consumption tax rates. In- 
tuitively, as domestic inflation approaches the rate dictated by the op- 
timum quantity of money rule, and hence the domestic nominal interest 
rate approaches zero, the building up of  reserves through the accu- 
mulation of inflation tax revenues diminishes. As a consequence, an 
increasing reliance on consumption taxes to raise money demand during 
the deadline  period is  necessitated.  Thus as domestic inflation falls 
toward the optimum quantity of money rate the consumption tax profile 
gets steeper. Similarly, the production and international borrowing sub- 
sidy profiles under a reserve  target  also get  steeper when domestic 
inflation is reduced. 334  Kent P.  Kimbrough 
One final extension would be to allow for intertemporal decisions 
on the production side of the economy. This could be done along the 
lines  suggested by  Aschauer and Greenwood (1983) or by  Helpman 
and Razin (1984). These extensions would also result in money being 
nonneutral and potentially allow for a richer interaction between mon- 
etary and fiscal policies. 
Extending the model along the lines suggested above to allow for 
variable velocity, real effects of inflation, and factor supply decisions 
can easily be accomplished by introducing leisure into the consumer’s 
utility function and assuming that domestic (foreign) money serves to 
economize on time spent transacting in domestic (foreign) markets.  l5 
In this case the optimal policies for trade balance and wealth targets 
remain the same as outlined in sections 9.4  and 9.5 with the additional 
proviso that domestic monetary policy should be guided by the opti- 
mum quantity of money rule, and interest should be paid on domestic 
holdings of foreign currency if  the optimum quantity of money rule is 
not being followed  abroad. The optimal policies for international  re- 
serve and balance of payments targets are more difficult to  characterize. 
At first, such goals seem to  call for  departing from the optimum quantity 
of money rule by pursuing policies that generate a real rate of return 
on domestic money in excess of that on internationally traded bonds 
(the goal being to stimulate the demand for domestic money). However, 
equilibria with this characteristic may be problematic. Further research 
into the link between the monetary mechanism  of exchange and the 
optimal policies for international reserve targets and balance of pay- 
ments goals thus seems warranted. 
Notes 
1.  For a thorough survey of the literature see Dixit (1985). 
2.  As will  become apparent shortly, since factor supplies are taken to be 
inelastic in the traditional two-sector model, Helpman’s result that the econ- 
omy’s real equilbirium duplicates that of a costless barter economy survives 
this extension to a production economy. See Aschauer and Greenwood (1983) 
and Helpman and Razin (1984) for examples in which, because of less than 
perfectly inelastic factor supplies, the monetary economy’s real equilibrium 
fails to replicate that of a costless barter economy. 
3.  See Helpman and Razin (1984) for a discussion of alternative monetary 
mechanisms. 
4. As noted by  Helpman (1981), by holding  interest-bearing  reserves the 
central bank minimizes its operating costs. For a discussion of the implications 
of interest-bearing versus non-interest-bearing reserves see Persson (1984). 
5.  This problem has been considered elsewhere by Greenwood and Kim- 
brough (1987) in a two-period setup similar to the one used here and by Das- 
gupta and Stiglitz (1974) in a barter economy with public production and non- 335  Optimal Tax Policy for Balance of Payments Objectives 
traded goods. In both of these papers the constraint (12) holds only for a single 
period. 
6. To see these results a bit more clearly, it may help to rewrite (14c) as 
p'-IU$/pN-lUfir = (d"/dN)[l  + (e'/A)l , 
where 8'  = 0 for t  = k  + 1, . . . and N is some arbitrary period after period 
k. It follows that the optimum tax on international borrowing in period t is 0'1 
A. 
7.  For a model in which this would not necessarily be the only component 
of the first-best policy because Ricardian equivalence fails to hold as the result 
of the uncertain  lifetimes of private agents, see Helpman and Razin (1987). 
8.  From the central bank's budget constraints appearing in (9) it is apparent 
that the condition bk 2  bff imposes a constraint not only on the behavior of the 
balance of payments prior to period k but after period k as well. In particular, 
it is required that 
The analysis presented in the text assumes that this constraint  is met by ap- 
propriately  setting domestic credit and/or the exchange rate, as captured  by 
,  in some distant future period  (i.e., as t -j  m).  Alternatively, tax policies 
like those discussed  in  the text could  be  employed.  These policies  can  be 
derived formally by adding the above as an additional constraint to (16). How- 
ever, since the policies for periods t = l, . . . ,  k are qualitatively unchanged, 
this approach has not been adopted in the text. In either case, the important 
point is that future policies are constrained by today's  international  reserve 
objectives. 
9.  This can be seen by rewriting (17c) as suggested in footnote 6 and noting 
that the optimal policy calls for subsidizing international borrowing in period 
tat  the rate ef(i/l + i)ys$, where 8'  = 0 fort = k  + 1, . . .  and y  = 0 for t 
= k and y =  1 for all other periods. 
10.  It is possible, in fact, that a country's external wealth,  6k2 may actually 
fall while international reserves are built up to the target level, bR. To see this, 
note that the policies outlined by (17) reduce income at world prices in periods 
t = I, .  . . ,  k. However, consumption smoothing on the part of private agents 
implies that this burden will be spread over the consumer's entire lifetime so 
that the trade balance will deteriorate in periods t =  I, . . . ,  k. Turning to the 
substitution  effects generated  by  (17), there are two to consider.  First, the 
consumption taxes in periods t  =  1, . . . ,  k that are instituted to attain the 
international reserve target raise the relative price of consuming in periods  t 
=  I, , . . ,  k versus all future periods. The intertemporal substitution effects 
generated by the consumption taxes thus work to improve the trade balance 
in periods t  = 1, . . . ,  k. On the other hand, the international reserve target 
calls for subsidies to international borrowing in periods t = I, . . . ,  k, and the 
attendant intertemporal substitution effects should serve to worsen the trade 
balance in periods t = 1, . . . ,  k. However, since the subsidies to international 
borrowing  are designed  to mitigate  the  distortions introduced  by  the con- 
sumption taxes, there is some presumption that the latter will dominate so that 
intertemporal  substitution effects will act to improve the trade balance. How- 
ever, if the wealth effects dominate these substitution effects, the trade balance 
will, on average, deteriorate in periods t = I, . . . ,  k, and the country's external 
wealth,  bk,  will fall even though  international reserves increase to the target 
level bR. 336  Kent P.  Kimbrough 
11.  Remarks similar to those in footnote 8 apply here also. 
12. For the results that follow, the weaker condition that dp‘ + )*I  be constant 
for t  =  1, . . . ,  k is actually all that is required. 
13. Again, following the suggestion made in footnote 6, it can be shown that 
the optimum subsidy to international borrowing is 61[a‘  -  a’*I/(l + i]sL,  where 
d=Ofort=k+  1, .... 
14. If  the monetary  mechanism of  exchange dictates that transactions be 
carried out in the buyer’s currency rather than  in the seller’s currency as is 
assumed here, the money market equilibrium condition (10) would be replaced 
by 
m:  = XI  + p‘Z‘,  f  =  1, 2, . . . . 
As discussed by Helpman and Razin (1984), when the buyer’s currency is used 
for transactions purposes the constraint (1 I) remains intact so long as foreign 
nominal interest rates and the rate of  depreciation  of the home currency, E‘, 
are constant. In this case it is easy to show that the results for a trade balance 
target are unaffected  while the results for a reserve target and a balance  of 
payments target are modified somewhat. In both instances the qualitative pat- 
tern for consumption taxes and taxes on international borrowing is the same 
as in the body of the paper, but the optimal policy no longer calls for subsidizing 
domestic production. That is, when the buyer’s currency is used for transac- 
tions  purposes, optimal  policies  for balance of  payments  objectives  do not 
involve distorting  production  decisions.  An  important corollary  of  this, of 
course, is that when the buyer’s currency is used for transactions purposes, 
tariffs, export subsidies, and the like are not a part of the optimal tax policy 
for balance of payments objectives. The rationale for these results is that when 
the buyer’s currency is used to finance transactions, production distortions do 
not help to improve the balance of payments. It is, therefore, optimal to leave 
production decisions undistorted. However, even when the buyer’s currency 
is used to finance transactions it is still true that, unlike a trade balance target, 
reserve targets and balance of  payments targets call for within-period  distor- 
tions to be introduced. 
15.  See Kimbrough  (1986b,  1986c) for a  closed-economy  version  of  the 
framework that is being suggested here. 
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CO~~eIlt  Joshua Aizenman 
Introduction 
Kimbrough articulates a very  useful intertemporal framework for 
studying optimal policies in an open economy. These policies are ap- 
plied to achieve exogenous balance of trade and international reserves 
targets, and they are derived in a welfare framework that recognizes 
the role  of  intertemporal  budget  constraints.  The author should  be 
praised for a clear exposition. Kent’s methodology is rich. It is, how- 
ever, applied only to a rather simple economy that includes enough 
Ricardian features to nullify the role of optimal policies. If we allow 
for departures from Ricardian assumptions, a richer interpretation of 
the policies studied in this paper is possible.  I will describe such ex- 
tensions and suggest applications of the methodology for economies in 
which optimal policies matter, and for which the policy targets can be 
derived endogenously, rather than postulated exogeneously as in Kim- 
brough’s paper. My comments include three parts. I will start with a 
brief review  of  Kimbrough’s methodology.  Next,  I will  discuss the 
monetary framework. Finally, I will suggest possible extensions of the 
methodology to a non-Ricardian world. 
The Methodology 
Kimbrough assumes an economy composed of consumers having an 
infinite horizon, with access to financial markets, and the authorities. 
Consumer income is generated by producing two goods, transfer pay- 
ments, and income accruing to the financial portfolio. Money is intro- 
duced in a Clower fashion, where domestic money buys domestic goods, 
and foreign money buys foreign goods. The authorities are composed 
of two consolidated branches: the fiscal branch, responsible for im- 
posing and  collecting the various taxes, and the monetary  branch, 
which manages the exchange rate and the credit policy. The economy 
is small, and the authorities have the capacity to impose all policies 
needed to achieve appropriate marginal conditions. 
The authorities solve the optimizing problem in two stages. First, 
the policymaker maximizes an expression of the type 
k 
U  + A[NPV*] +  eiHi, 
i-  1 
where U is the utility of  a representative consumer: NPV* is the in- 
tertemporal budget constraint, equalizing the net present value of con- 
sumption and production evaluated at the world prices  and interest 
Joshua Aizenman  is associate professor  of business economics at  the University  of 
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rates. Hi  is the constraint imposed by the policy target i.  In optimizing 
equation (1) the policymaker chooses the optimal path of consumption 
and production. Armed  with the resultant  optimal path, the policy- 
maker then moves to the second stage-a  design of a menu of taxes 
to motivate consumers and producers to follow the optimal consump- 
tion and production plans. The two-stage methodology simplifies the 
calculations in such a way that we use the world undistorted prices in 
stage 1, and we solve for the implied set of taxes only in stage 2. 
Kimbrough’s article analyzes two distinct sets of issues. First, he 
examines the design of  policies aimed at a balance of trade targets 
(sections 9.4-9.5).  Second, he studies policies aimed at international 
reserves targets. (sections 9.6-9.7).  Trade balance targets are shown 
to be equivalent to intertemporal consumption targets. To invoke taxes 
on intertemporal borrowing is thus shown to be optimal. This policy 
changes the intertemporal prices so that we obtain the desired path of 
consumption. Optimal policies do not, however, include changes in the 
within-period relative prices. The second set of targets, related to in- 
ternational reserves, is achieved by using all policy instruments, chang- 
ing both the within-period and the intertemporal prices. 
The Monetary Framework 
In developing the monetary sector Kimbrough adopts the cash-in- 
advance formulation. Accordingly, agents are required to purchase the 
goods of a country with the money of  that country. In this formulation 
the demand for money does not depend on the interest rate. It is useful 
to assess the role of the monetary framework in  policy-instruments 
determination. The two sets of issues analyzed by Kimbrough differ 
sharply from each other in terms of the robustness of  the results with 
respect to changes in the monetary framework. The policy prescriptions 
relevant  for the attainment  of  the second  set of  targets  (related to 
reserves and balance of payments objectives) are not robust. Sensible 
changes in the monetary framework alter the results. As is reported 
by the author in footnote 14, if the domestic currency is used to finance 
domestic consumption of both goods, optimal policies aimed at achiev- 
ing the second set of targets are altered significantly. Furthermore, if 
one abolishes the Clower constraint in favor of a flexible velocity tech- 
nology of  exchange, the results are affected considerably. Crude em- 
piricism suggests that in most cases the monetary mechanism is indeed 
of the flexible velocity type, where only domestic money is used in 
financing consumption  of  both  types of  goods.’  There is, however, 
I.  Another bothersome feature of the monetary framework applied in the paper is the 
absence of real balance effects. As is shown by Feenstra (1985), this reflects the specific 
assumptions regarding the sequence of exchange of goods and money. Note also that a 
Clower constraint of  the  type applied in  the  article  implies  that  inflation tax can be 
applied to  achieve costlessly any revenue target (up to  almost all  the G.N.P.). These 340  Kent P.  Kimbrough 
another difficulty with  the proposed policies.  As  the  author rightly 
points out, the same reserves and balance of payments targets can be 
achieved at a lowest cost by the appropriate monetary policy, reflecting 
the comparative advantage of the monetary policy in reaching reserves 
objectives. Kimbrough offers no economic reason for studying reserves 
targets in terms of an inferior framework, where only taxes (and sub- 
sidies) are instrumental in achieving balance of payments objectives. 
Unlike the balance of payments targets, the first set of targets (related 
to balance of trade objectives) is achieved using policies that are robust 
with respect to changes in the monetary framework. Kimbrough’s anal- 
ysis of the balance of  trade objective provides important insight into 
this issue. 
Extensions and Qualifications 
In Kimbrough’s analysis, the attainment of all targets reduces wel- 
fare, and no clear economic interpretation is provided for the existence 
of welfare-reducing targets. This is a necessary feature of the Ricardian 
framework invoked in the paper; in such a framework, any policy is 
welfare-reducing. Relaxation of the assumptions underlying the Ricar- 
dian framework may  not be  simple but, at the same time, is highly 
desirable. Specifically, in a non-Ricardian framework the policy targets 
can be derived endogenously, and the policy instruments have a richer 
interpretation. In the following comments I would like to propose an 
alternative interpretation of  the results regarding the balance of trade 
targets and describe non-Ricardian justification for various policies. 
An Alternative Ricardian Interpretation of  Policies Aimed at Balance 
of Trade Targets 
Kimbrough’s results regarding a balance  of trade targets have an 
alternative interpretation, in terms of  traditional commercial policies. 
Equation (13) in the paper can be used to demonstrate that an import 
level target at time t (IM,) calls for import tax at time t (I.T.,) . We  can 
summarize this result by 
(2a)  IM, +  I.T., 
at time t (E.S.,) : 
(2b)  EX, +  E.S., 
As a result, a balance of trade target at time t (B.O.T.,) calls for the 
simultaneous use of both a tariff and an export subsidy at time t, and 
optimally calls for equal rates: 
Similarly, an export target at time t (EX,) calls for an export subsidy 
considerations suggest that the applicability of a rigid Clower constraint in a public finance 
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= (C.T., & P.S.,) 
equal 
rates 
(3)  B.O.T., +  (E.S., & I.T.,) 
equal 
rates 
In general, these two policies are equivalent to a uniform consump- 
tion tax at time t (C.T.,)  and a uniform equal production subsidy at 
time t (P.S.,) . Subject to Ricardian equivalency (R.E.), these policies 
are equivalent also to a tax on intertemporal borrowing applied at time 
] = T.B., 
equal 
rates 
t (T.B.,) : 
(4) 
[(E.S., & I.T.,) 
In general, however, a segmented capital market will require the si- 
multaneous use of both borrowing and consumption/production taxes 
and subsidies. We  turn now to a brief examination of  this possibility. 
Limited Access to Capital Markets 
Suppose that a typical  less-developed  country faces a balance  of 
trade target. Would intertemporal taxes on borrowing be the optimal 
policy instrument, as suggested in Kimbrough's  article? This seems 
unlikely, but the methodology applied in the paper is useful in assessing 
the problem, nevertheless. To take an extreme case, suppose that con- 
sumers, in contrast with government, do not have free access to capital 
markets. The planner problem can still be specified in terms of equation 
(1). The first-order conditions (equations  14  a-c in the text) are still 
relevant. The implied policies, however, differ sharply. Notice that the 
first-order conditions for a balance of trade target (equations 14 a-c) 
can be written as 
MU: 
MU:-' 
where MU:  is the marginal utility of x at time t,  uT-  I  is the world interest 
rate, and k, depends on the tightness of the balance of  trade target.* 
In the paper, equation (5) has the interpretation that a balance of trade 
calls for taxes on international borrowing such that the domestic in- 
terest rate (rt-  ,) satisfies 
2.  Equation (2)  assumes that the foreign price ofX  is normalized to 1. Similar equation 
applies for  K  where P; stands for the external relative prices at t(P; = P.;,,/P;,,)  : 342  Kent P.  Kimbrough 
It is noteworthy that there is a broader interpretation of equation (5). 
In general, a desired change in international prices can also be achieved 
by a set of time varying uniform consumption taxes, such that: 
where E,  stands for the consumption tax at time t. In a Ricardian econ- 
omy the two policies (i.e., a borrowing tax and an intertemporal uni- 
form consumption, and production taxes and subsidies) are equivalent. 
Notice, however, that once consumers lack access to capital markets, 
taxes on international borrowing are not an efficient means of reaching 
the desired intertemporal shadow prices. Equation (5)  is still valid. But 
the appropriate policy will involve imposition of uniform (time varying) 
consumption and production taxes rather than taxes on borrowing. In 
the general case, with limited participation of some agents in the fi- 
nancial market, a balance of trade target will require the simultaneous 
use of both borrowing and uniform (time varying) consumption taxes. 
Even  in  this  non-Ricardian  economy, a  major  conclusion  of  Kim- 
brough's  analysis is relevant:  balance of  trade  targets are achieved 
optimally by leaving within the period relative prices intact. 
Costs of Tax Collection and Revenue Targets 
Most countries, especially L.D.C.s, are confronted with a tax system 
in which there are direct collection and enforcement costs associated 
with various taxes. The presence of collection costs can explain the 
economics of various distorting policies that lack the appropriate eco- 
nomic justification in a Ricardian world. The problem of the authorities, 
for example, can be cast in terms of  the maximization of a modified 
version of equation (l), optimizing consumers' welfare subject to a net 
revenue target: 
(1') 
where C is private consumption, G is public sector consumption, C.C. 
is the direct cost of collecting and enforcing taxes, G.N.P. stands for 
output, G is government consumption, T is the gross tax revenue (in- 
cluding the collection costs C.C.), and NPV'  is the net present value 
obtained  using world  prices.3 Such a framework can  be  applied  to 
3.  Thus, C  + G  + C.C. - G.N.P. = 0 is the economy-wide budget con- 
straint, and G - (T - C.C.) = 0 is the public sector budget constraint. 
U  + A  [NPV*(C + G + C.C. - G.N.P.)] 
+ B[NPV*(G - (T - C.C.))], 343  Optimal Tax Policy for Balance of Payments Objectives 
demonstrate that a weak fiscal system will tend to use both inflation 
tax and tariffs because both have low collection  Furthermore, 
it can be shown that if  the policy target is allocative, we tend to use 
only one instrument. If the target is the level of imports, only a tariff 
should be used.  If  the target is an intertemporal consumption path, 
only taxes on borrowing should be used. If the target is to raise revenue, 
then under restrictive conditions on the feasible set of taxes, both tariffs 
and borrowing taxes will be used.’  In general, costs of tax collection 
suffice to explain the application of various policies that otherwise lack 
an economic justification. 
Country Risk 
Reserves targets are discussed in sections 9.6-9.7.  These targets are 
welfare reducing in the context of  Kimbrough’s framework. They can 
be rationalized for a country facing an upward sloping supply of credit 
due to country-risk considerations. Such a country will benefit from 
appropriate build-up of  international reserves by the authorities. The 
authorities will rely on reserves in servicing the debt during a recession 
where the feasible tax base is small, and will replenish reserves during 
expansion. Naturally, in a Ricardian world such a task is redundant (or 
even welfare reducing). In a more realistic world, citizens of a country 
whose authorities have limited taxing capacity tend to be barred from 
the  international  credit  market,  leaving an  important  consumption 
smoothing role for the authorities.6 
Concluding Remarks 
This article presents a very useful methodology for designing optimal 
policies to achieve exogenous targets. The methodology is even more 
useful when applied in a non-Ricardian framework. Such an application 
should  modify  the  analysis in  (at least) two ways.  First,  in  a non- 
Ricardian framework the various policy targets can be derived endog- 
enously. Second, non-Ricardian considerations will affect the optimal 
policy instruments. For example, in a Ricardian system traditional pol- 
icies aimed at a balance of trade targets (like a time varying uniform 
tariffs and uniform equal export subsidies) are equivalent to a tax on 
intertemporal borrowing. Segmented capital markets break this equiv- 
alency, necessitating the use of both traditional policies and taxes on 
intertemporal borrowing.  In general, greater segmentation of capital 
4. See Aizenman (1985b). 
5. See Aizenman (1986). 
6. Implications of  limited taxing capacity  on international borrowing are 
analyzed by Sachs (1984). On  the use of international reserves, see Frenkel 
and Aizenman (1982). For an analysis of the role of country risk, see Edwards 
(1985) and Harberger (1976). 344  Kent P.  Kimbrough 
markets tend to put a greater weight on tarrifs and export promotions 
as the efficient means of reaching balance of trade targets. It is note- 
worthy that even in this non-Ricardian economy, an important insight 
of Kimbrough’s analysis is relevant: balance of trade targets are achieved 
optimally by leaving within the period relative prices intact. 
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Comment  Robert G. Murphy 
Introduction 
The article by Kent Kimbrough presents a neatly worked-out solu- 
tion for the structure of optimal distortionary taxes in  an economy 
facing certain noneconomic constraints on either its trade account or 
its balance of payments. In particular, for the cases involving balance 
of payments constraints the author provides very clearly the economic 
intuition behind what turn out to be rather complicated sets of optimal 
taxes and subsidies on consumption, production, and borrowing. 
The analysis is carried  out using a cash-in-advance  technology  of 
monetary exchange that implies a unitary  velocity of money.  In my 
comments I will consider the extent to which this mechanism of mon- 
etary exchange is critical for some of the policy prescriptions presented 
by  Kimbrough,  but  relatively unimportant for others. In addition, I 
will raise a few concerns of  mainly an expositional nature. 
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Monetary Mechanisms and Optimal Taxes 
In Kimbrough’s article, the particular timing of transactions assumed 
for the economy along with the cash-in-advance  constraint  imply a 
unitary velocity of money. This constant velocity of money assumption 
links the demand for money directly to the value of domestic production 
in a rigid fashion. It is this link between domestic production and money 
demand that determines in part the nature of the policy prescriptions 
obtained in the paper. 
There are two types of noneconomic objectives considered in the 
paper.  One type involves either a cumulative trade balance (wealth) 
target over a given time interval or a separate trade balance target for 
each period during a given time interval. The other type involves either 
a cumulative balance of payments (reserve) target over a given time 
interval or separate balance of payments targets during a given time 
interval. The article finds that for objectives related to the trade bal- 
ance, optimal policy involves only taxes on borrowing during periods 
when the constraint binds. No within-period distortions on consump- 
tion or production are prescribed. It appears that this is a rather general 
result, one that is  not dependent on the manner in  which money is 
modeled (although dependent on utility being separable across periods 
and agents having infinite horizons). The reason the monetary mech- 
anism does not matter here is that trade balance targets to not require 
any change in the intertemporal pattern of the excess flow demand for 
money.  All  that  is  needed  is  to alter the  intertemporal  pattern  of 
consumption. 
For objectives relating to the balance of payments, the article shows 
that optimal policy involves, in general, taxes or subsidies on produc- 
tion, consumption, and borrowing during the periods  when the con- 
straint binds. Production and consumption choices are distorted through 
taxes and subsidies so as to increase the excess flow demand for money 
and, hence, meet the balance of payments target. Borrowing is sub- 
sidized so as to alleviate the welfare loss arising from distortion of 
within period choices. These results appear to be critically dependent 
on the manner in which money is modeled. The reason for this is that 
in  order to meet a balance of payments constraint, the government 
must  alter the intertemporal pattern  of  the excess flow demand for 
money. The policies that are necessary to achieve these objectives are 
therefore strongly influenced by the nature of the monetary mechanism. 
To illustrate these points, consider an alternative method of modeling 
money where consumers hold domestic money to reduce the time spent 
transacting. Furthermore, assume that utility is a function of  leisure 
as  well  as goods.  If  labor  supply  is assumed to be  inelastic, as in 
Kimbrough’s paper, then the level of real money balances will directly 346  Kent P.  Kimbrougb 
affect the level of utility but will have no direct effect on production. 
In this framework where the velocity of money is permitted to vary, 
the government seeks to maximize (notation follows Kimbrough) 
p'-  'u(X',Z',rn') 
f=l 
subject to the constraint that the present value of consumption equal 
the present value of production and the particular constraint associated 
with possible noneconomic objectives. For the case of a k-period cu- 
mulative trade balance (wealth) target of 6, the LaGrangian expression 
is 
(2)  Max  2 pr-'u(Xr,Zf,rnf)  + XCd"{X;(p;) -  XI  + P*~[Z;@:) 
cc 
{x'*Z',fflr,pS)  I = I 
First-order conditions for this problem are identical to those obtained 
in Kimbrough's approach except for the additional condition that nom- 
inal interest rates be set equal to zero via the optimal rate of  inflation. 
Likewise, results for the case of separate trade balance targets in each 
period during a given time interval are equivalent for both the money- 
in-the-utility function approach and Kimbrough's  approach. 
For the case of a k-period cumulative balance of payments (reserves) 
target of bR, the LaGrangian expression for a money-in-utility function 
approach is: 
where the consumer's  first-order  condition  for holdings of  real  bal- 
ances, uAIu$ = it/(l + it) is accounted for in the goverment's optim- 
ization problem. The first-order conditions for the government's policy 
involve conditions for consumption, production, and borrowing, as well 
as for real money balances. The first-order conditions for consumption 
and production are 
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= p*r,  for all t. 
-  axyap: 
az;/ap; 
The optimal policy here does not involve any production distortion 
and involves distorting consumption choices only in  periods prior to 
period k. These results differ sharply from Kimbrough’s where, pro- 
duction is  subsidized  in  periods one  through  k  and consumption is 
distorted most heavily during the last period of the constraint. Similar 
differences  in  results  between  the money-in-the-utility function ap- 
proach  and Kimbrough’s approach  arise for the  case of a separate 
balance of payments target in each period. Thus, the results for optimal 
tax policy when facing balance of payments targets are extremely sen- 
sitive to the manner in which money is modeled. 
Expositional Issues 
The author does not discuss the production side of the economy in 
any detail. For instance, the issue of how transactions in factor markets 
occur is left to the imagination of the reader. In addition, the timing of 
transactions in goods markets seems somewhat confusing. An agent is 
described as receiving at the beginning of the period a payment for the 
goods he sold last period. However, the same agent is described as 
buying goods at the end of the period. Presumably another agent sells 
the goods and receives payment? Or is there a “firm”  present that 
pays out “dividends”  next period? Clarification of these timing issues 
would be helpful. 
At  various  points in  the article the author notes that the cash-in- 
advance constraints will be binding when nominal interest  rates are 
positive. This is described as occurring when the nominal interest rate 
exceeds “the rate dictated by the optimum quantity of money rule.” 
In the context of a model in which inflation has no  effect on the velocity 
of money, however, it is not very informative to frame the discussion 
in terms of the optimal inflation tax. 
Conclusion 
To summarize briefly, I have strong reservations concerning the par- 
ticular  mechanism  of monetary exchange employed  by  Kimbrough. 
The unitary  velocity of  money assumption implied by  his monetary 
framework is of critical importance for the qualitative nature of policies 
seeking to attain targets related to the overall balance of  payments. 
Future research should attempt to derive optimal policies for achieving 
balance of payments objectives in settings that permit more plausible 
mechanisms of monetary exchange. In particular, the role of  inflation 
in distorting consumer behavior should be recognized. This Page Intentionally Left Blank